

**SAVANNAH RIVER SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL
EXERCISE
February 25, 1998**

3.0 Objectives

The objectives listed in this section are based on a simulated transportation emergency and will be performed and evaluated according to the standards outlined in the Extend of Play.

Exercise Safety

The exercise will be planned and conducted in a manner that promotes and adheres to all SRS safety policies and postures.

Extent of Play:

This objective will be demonstrated by the ESD organization during the planning and conduct of the exercise event and by all player response organizations during the conduct of the exercise, such that zero injuries and no compromise of the site's safety policies and posture results, as follows:

Exercise pre-planning shall include adequate and appropriate independent safety reviews of all scenario details/manual(s) and materials and pre-planned safety measures, particularly in the area of "prop-scene" simulations and actual demonstrations of equipment and personnel in the field (ambulance/EMS, WSI Protective Forces, Special Response Team (SRT), protective action implementation, etc.).

All exercise briefings (player, controller, evaluator, and observer) shall include details on all safety measures, responsibilities, precautions, and limitations in effect for the exercise. Designated on-scene controllers, evaluators, observers, and players in the area of WSI Protective Forces play will attend the WSI safety briefing.

All individual controllers shall have unilateral responsibility to vigilantly observe exercise play and stop any unsafe (or potentially unsafe) player/controller action. Additionally, an independent safety observer organization shall be in place with authority and responsibility to issue a "stop work" order, if necessary, due to unsafe actions potentially compromising individual or equipment safety.

Additional on-scene safety objectives and Extent of Play to be used to brief controllers are contained in the WSI Test Plan, kept under separate cover for security purposes. The test plan is available by request on a need-to-know basis.

**SAVANNAH RIVER SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL
EXERCISE**

February 25, 1998

Emergency Response Organization

A.1. The emergency response organization will perform their missions, specified authorities, and responsibilities for emergency response and mitigation in accordance with approved procedures.

Extent of Play:

This objective will be demonstrated by each emergency response organization/team as it would be during an emergency. The following organizations and teams will participate in the exercise: Wackenhut Services-SRS (WSI-SRS); Savannah River Site Operations Center (SRSOC); Emergency Operations Center (EOC), to include the Executive Team Room; including the Spent Fuel Storage Division Technical Support Room (TSR), Logistics Support Room (LSR), Emergency Information Room (EIR), Administrative Support Room, Command Room, and the Joint Information Center (JIC); 719-A Medical staff; and the SRS Fire Department.

A.2. The emergency response organization will demonstrate the ability to make conservative decisions about site conditions and personnel exposure in the absence of confirmed data.

Extent of Play:

This objective will be demonstrated by each emergency response organization/team, as it would be during an emergency. Following are some of the response actions that will require the ERO to make conservative assessments and decisions. Additional details regarding each of these actions are provided in the extents of play for objectives "C," "E," and "F," respectively.

Classification:

As soon as a hostile threat is confirmed, WSI should make a Phase III declaration. A Phase II declaration would not be conservative enough, and a Phase IV would be too conservative, based on procedural guidance. Once a Phase II or higher declaration is made, the EDO should declare an Alert based on EAL A-3.1. The EDO may declare a Supervisory Judgment Site Area Emergency (SAE), based on the threat to destroy a Spent Nuclear Fuel cask, but would not be required to make such a classification based on procedural guidance or conservative logic. Following the explosion, the EOC could also make a conservative decision that a cask has been breached and classify the emergency as an SAE, based on a projected dose of greater than 1 rem at 100 meters from the release. However, because it would be nearly impossible to breach a cask, the EOC may also reasonably decide not to declare a SAE until/unless Field Monitoring Teams confirm that a release has actually occurred.

**SAVANNAH RIVER SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL
EXERCISE
February 25, 1998**

Regardless of whether an SAE is declared, however, conservative protective actions should be taken, as described below.

Protective Actions:

The ERO should, at a minimum, evacuate personnel within 900 feet of suspected bombs. However, because the exact location and size of the bombs will not be known initially, and because suspected felons are reportedly loose on the site, a more conservative protective action decision is expected. Considering that the exact size of the bomb is not known and that the adversaries claim it is large enough to breach a shipping cask, the ERO may cordon off an area of about one-half mile (at least 2400 feet) based on protective action guidance for a 500-pound bomb. The ERO may also conservatively shelter all persons within a two-mile radius of the approximate location of the bombs/adversaries, and could potentially issue a remain-indoors protective action for the remainder of the site until the adversaries who are at-large are captured by WSI. After the explosion occurs, a shelter protective action for a two-mile radius and downwind to the site boundary would be a good conservative decision, even though the likelihood of a release is negligible, until Field Monitoring Teams confirm that no release has occurred. Another conservative protective action would be the relocation of personnel in the Classification Yard based on nearby explosive devices, at-large adversaries in the immediate vicinity, and the remote potential of radiological materials being released toward their downwind location.

Consequence Assessment:

Although hazards assessment documents conclude that breach of an SNF shipping cask is not credible, consequence assessment personnel in the TSR and LSR should conservatively assume that the incredible has happened and begin determining various source term calculations involving breached casks until it is confirmed that no release has occurred. However, because the breach of a cask is considered an incredible event, the ERO may not necessarily upgrade the event classification based on the worst-case projected dose, until/unless field measurements confirm that a release has occurred. (However, conservative protective actions should be taken regardless of how remote the possibility of release.)

**SAVANNAH RIVER SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL
EXERCISE**

February 25, 1998

Offsite Response Interfaces

B. Effectively interface and coordinate with federal, state and local agencies and organizations responsible for offsite emergency response, protection of the environment, and health and safety of the public, in accordance with approved procedures.

Extent of Play:

This objective will be demonstrated in accordance with SRSOC 317-1, "Operations Center Response to Emergencies" and EPIP 6Q-300, "Command Room Operations." An SRS control cell will be used to role-play state and local organizations with the exception of DOE-HQ EOC and the FBI (Aiken Office).

All other offsite notifications will occur as described in the Extent of Play for Objective D. Section 5.0 of this manual describes control cell requirements. Communications and coordination between the DOE-HQ Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and the SRS EOC will be in accordance with EPIP 6Q-300, "Command Room Operations."

Determination of Emergency Event Class

C. Accurately classify, upgrade, and/or terminate the emergency classification in a timely manner and in accordance with approved procedures.

Extent of Play:

Initially, a "Security Alert" or a Security Phase I or II may be declared based on supervisory judgment prior to the WSI LE Officer being fired upon. Once the SRSOC/WSI LE has been notified of the adversaries' actions (i.e., hijacking a SNF shipment, taking hostages, shooting at a WSI Officer, and threatening to blow up an SNF cask), WSI should declare a Security Phase III in accordance with ESOP 2-201, "Emergency Security Operations Procedure." The EDO should declare an Alert based on a Phase II or higher declaration, in accordance with EPIP 6Q-114, "Emergency Classification." If WSI does not make a Phase II or higher declaration, the Incident Commander will be prompted to do so, and if the EDO does not declare an Alert or higher within 15 minutes of the WSI declaration, he/she will be prompted to do so. Contingency messages will be issued if a decision is made to activate only the graded ERO, rather than the full ERO, and/or if it is decided that the JIC is not needed (JIC activation is not mandatory at an Alert classification).

**SAVANNAH RIVER SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL
EXERCISE
February 25, 1998**

Based on the threat to destroy hazardous material, the EDO may declare a Site Area Emergency based on EAL SAE-3.1, "Supervisory Judgment." Using EAL SAE-1.1, the EOC Emergency Manager may also consider a Site Area Emergency classification upgrade after the explosion occurs, based on radiological source term dose projections of >1 rem at 100 meters. However, because breach of a shipping cask was screened out of site hazards assessment documents as an incredible event, the ERO may make conservative protective actions but postpone upgrade to a Site Area Emergency until Field Monitoring Teams can confirm that a release has occurred. No classification higher than SAE is expected.

Notifications and Communications

D. Perform all onsite and offsite notifications in accordance with approved procedures.

Extent of Play:

Notifications will be conducted in accordance with EPIP 6Q-117, "Emergency Notification (EN) Preparation and Transmission" and/or EPIP 6Q-120, "Operational Emergency Notifications"; SRSOC 317-1, "Operations Center Response to Emergencies"; as well as ESOP 2-201, "Emergency Security Operations Procedure." Communications and coordination between the DOE-HQ Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and the SRS EOC will be in accordance with EPIP 6Q-300, "Command Room Operations."

ERO members will be notified of an emergency classification via appropriate notification systems, i.e., pager, public address announcements and telephone. A control cell will be used to role-play the states of Georgia, South Carolina and the Aiken, Allendale, Barnwell, and Burke County Warning Points. All initial notifications will actually be made via commercial telephone and fax within 15 minutes of the declaration or change in classification level to the states and local counties using an Emergency Notification Network (ENN) or an SRS Operational Emergency Advisory Form. The SRS Executive Team Room may be used for this exercise.

The DOE HQ EOC will be activated and staffed sufficiently to provide the requisite communications interfaces with the SRS emergency response organization.

The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) (Aiken Office) will also participate. The bureau will actually be notified, and a field representative is expected to actually respond to the SRSOC EOC and incident scene.

SAVANNAH RIVER SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL EXERCISE

February 25, 1998

Additional communications/interface between SRS and federal, state and county agencies will be simulated through the use of an SRS control cell.

Simulated agencies include the Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, National Response Center and Department of Transportation.

Consequence Assessment

E. Assess the actual or potential onsite and offsite consequences and develop onsite protective actions and offsite protective action recommendations in accordance with approved procedures.

Extent of Play:

This objective will be demonstrated by the SRSOC and EOC in accordance with EPIP 6Q-103, "Protective Actions" and ESOP 2-201, "Emergency Security Operations Procedure." The Site ERO should perform various worst-case radiological source term dose projections during the response in accordance with EPIP-6Q-122, "Operation of the Hotspot Radiological Dispersion Model" and/or through operation of the WIND System Puff/Plume GUI dispersion dose projection model. The Logistic Support Room (LSR) will deploy Field Monitoring Teams to monitor for radioactive contamination.

As described under Objective F, "Protective Actions," the EDO and/or EOC personnel may also use attachments 12, 13, and 15 of EPIP-6Q-116, "Security Operations," to determine protective actions before and after the bomb threats are confirmed. The EDO/EOC may also use information in *the North American Emergency Response Guidebook* to help determine protective actions for an accident involving radiological hazardous materials, as well as procedural guidance for security emergencies as found in *the SRS Emergency Plan (SCD-7)*. Possible uses for each of these resources are described under Objective F.

Protective Actions

F. Implement onsite protective actions and offsite protective action recommendations in accordance with approved procedures.

Extent of Play:

This objective will be demonstrated by the SRSOC and/or EOC in accordance with EPIP 6Q-103, "Protective Actions"; EPIP 6Q-116, "Security Operations," and ESOP 2-201, "Emergency Security Operations Procedure." Continuous accountability will be demonstrated for incident scene response personnel at the Tactical Operations Center (TOC).

SAVANNAH RIVER SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL EXERCISE

February 25, 1998

Per Attachment 12 of EPIP 6Q-116, "Security Operations," various protective actions may be taken based on the credible threat of an explosive device. The ERO may attempt to determine the size of the bomb and issue protective actions based on Attachment 15 of EPIP 6Q-116. The minimum protective action for a confirmed explosive device is evacuation for a 900-foot radius.

In preparation for the threatened explosion, the EDO or members of the EOC may also reference the *North American Emergency Response Guidebook* (NAERG Guide 165) for the specific hazardous materials involved. The NAERG recommends an initial protective action of "evacuation" for at least 300 meters or a 1000-foot radius (360 degrees) when a large quantity of radioactive material is involved in a major fire. However, because an explosion is potentially a greater hazard than a major fire, the EDO or Emergency Director may assume the worst and conservatively determine a shelter or evacuation protective action for areas in a two-mile radius of the incident near SRS Road 8 and downwind to the site boundary. This protective action may include P-Area, the SRS Classification Yard, and Barricade (4). WSI will be responsible for cordoning off the incident scene, detouring vehicle traffic from the area and ensuring protective actions at the scene are maintained.

Protective actions will be simulated for all personnel/areas outside of the exercise area with the exception of the Classification Yard. Personnel at the Classification Yard will implement protective actions as determined by the SRS EDO by way of the KEB "All Call." In addition to the danger from the explosion and the hazardous materials, the EDO, Incident Commander and/or Emergency Director should also consider the danger from the fleeing adversaries who are at-large. Security protective actions, as outlined in Section 7 of the *SRS Emergency Plan* (SCD-7), include the following:

- 1) personnel in the immediate vicinity of the incident (i.e., Classification Yard), may, upon hearing gunshots and/or seeing the escaped/wounded train crewman, go to the nearest building, get under or behind large pieces of furniture or equipment, and wait for WSI instructions.
- 2) personnel in affected areas may be relocated to a safe area.
- 3) personnel in affected areas may be directed to an ad hoc rally point (which should be swept for explosive devices)

Personnel in the Classification Yard will actually implement protective actions until 12 noon. After 12 noon, protective actions for those persons will be simulated and they will be allowed to return to their work places exempt from exercise play.

**SAVANNAH RIVER SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL
EXERCISE
February 25, 1998**

After the simulated explosion occurs, the EDO and/or Emergency Director may determine a shelter or evacuation protective action for areas in a two-mile radius of the incident near SRS Road 8 and downwind to the site boundary. This protective action may include P-Area and Barricade 4. Protective action implementation for each/all of these areas will be simulated.

Public Information

G.1. Develop and disseminate accurate and timely information to the news media in accordance with approved procedures.

Extent of Play:

This objective will be demonstrated at the EOC and at the Joint Information Center in accordance with EPIP 6Q-600, "Public Information Operations." News releases will be generated and submitted to DOE for approval and dissemination within about an hour of receipt of notification of the event.

News releases developed during the exercise will be transmitted by fax to the SRS Control Cell (simulating offsite news media outlets) and will not be transmitted/disseminated by fax to actual news organizations and wire services. Actual media personnel (local and DOE) may participate in the JIC and role-play members of the news media. A minimum of two news conferences will be held, with at least one briefing conducted by each shift before and after shift change.

G.2. Disseminate accurate information and instructions to the public in accordance with approved procedures.

Extent of Play:

This objective will be demonstrated by personnel in the Emergency Information Room (EIR) and Joint Information Center in accordance with EPIP-600, "Public Information Operations." EIR staff will respond to simulated calls from the public, governmental officials, and news media. A control cell will be used to role-play the callers.

Emergency Response Staff Activities

H.1. Staff and activate emergency facilities and teams in an effective and timely manner and in accordance with approved procedures.

**SAVANNAH RIVER SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL
EXERCISE
February 25, 1998**

Extent of Play:

This objective will be demonstrated by all participating emergency response site/facility EROs and teams, which includes: Wackenhut Services-SRS (WSI-SRS); the Savannah River Site Operations Center (SRSOC); the Emergency Operations Center (EOC); including the Spent Fuel Storage Division Technical Support Room (TSR), Executive Response Team, and the Joint Information Center (JIC); and the SRS Fire Department. Personnel will report to the appropriate emergency response facility following notification via pager, public address system, or telephone.

Activation of the EOC should be completed within an hour of declaration of the emergency and activities will be carried out as in an emergency. Joint Information Center activation should occur within about an hour of the decision to activate the JIC facility. The WSI Tactical Operations Center (TOC) should be activated to provide command and control of on-scene operations. The Fire Department is expected to respond and report to the WSI IC in a Unified Command role. Field Monitoring Teams (FMT's) will be deployed by the LSR to monitor for possible radioactive contamination.

K-Reactor emergency response facilities and personnel will not participate in the exercise, other than the K-Reactor Control Room/AEC to communicate with the Spent Nuclear Fuels TSR upon activation. The Offsite JIC or onsite Alternate EOC will not be staffed/activated for the purpose of exercise evaluations. If a decision is made to staff/activate offsite or onsite alternate emergency facilities, this action will be prevented and the decision process will be evaluated.

H.2. Implement a shift change for the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and Joint Information Center (JIC) in an effective and timely manner and in accordance with approved procedures.

Extent of Play:

This objective will be demonstrated by personnel in the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in accordance with EPIP-300, "Command Room Operations (CRO)," and Joint Information Center (JIC) in accordance with EPIP-600, "Public Information Operations (PIO)." The EOC and JIC will be required to implement a shift change during the exercise. Preparations should include development of a shift change schedule and preparation/delivery of a turnover briefing to ensure all appropriate items are discussed with incoming responding replacement personnel. Field activities will not demonstrate shift change. Also, certain positions staffed by WSRC ESD personnel may not demonstrate shift change due to controller demands.

**SAVANNAH RIVER SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL
EXERCISE**

February 25, 1998

H.3 Utilizing the incident command system, mitigate the emergency and bring the situation under control in accordance with approved procedures.

Extent of Play:

This objective will be demonstrated by the Incident Commander (IC) at the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) as well as by all personnel reporting to the TOC, including WSI Law Enforcement (LE), Special Response Teams (SRT), and WSI Crisis Negotiation Team personnel (CNT), as well as the Fire Department. ERO staff will determine Incident Scene status, develop appropriate strategies, and interpret controller-inject messages and data to bring the emergency situation under control.

Personnel protective equipment as well as equipment and gear necessary to mitigate scene conditions (e.g., site ambulance/EMS, WSI Aviation Department, canine units, etc.) appropriate to the response will be employed as needed. Mitigative actions may include: apprehension of the fleeing adversaries (if the effort does not improve efforts to contain and control the scene); crisis negotiation with the adversary leader on board the train; freeing of hostages; containment of the explosive scene; and location and disarming of explosive devices.

H.4 Utilizing the incident command system, coordinate and control operations, monitoring, and special team operations in accordance with approved procedures.

Extent of Play:

This objective will be demonstrated by the WSI LE Lt. and/or the Incident Commander (IC), the WSI Tactical Operations Center (TOC), Site Security Commander, EDO and the EOC Emergency Manager based upon the conditions presented in the scenario.

The IC should identify the hazards involved in the incident and coordinate the response as he/she would in an emergency. An exclusion/isolation zone appropriate to the incident will be identified and utilized to control access and egress to the hazardous materials scene near the railroad tracks and SRS Road 8. The ability to coordinate and exchange information between the TOC and the EOC staff shall be demonstrated.

Additional on-scene command and control objectives and Extent of Play to be used to brief controllers are contained in the WSI Test Plan and kept under separate cover for security purposes. The test plan is available by request on a need-to-know basis.

**SAVANNAH RIVER SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL
EXERCISE
February 25, 1998**

H.5. Demonstrate the ability to provide adequate medical support for onsite personnel.

Extent of Play:

This objective will be demonstrated by Fire Department Emergency Medical Services personnel and Site Medical in accordance with approved procedures. Medical protocol will be demonstrated. Moulage will be used to simulate the physical injuries on the adversary leader and train on controller injects, if required. The utmost caution will be used when transporting victim(s) on backboards or gurneys, should it be necessary.

Non-critical patients (site employees only) will be transported to site medical facilities by the SRSFD and treated by Site Medical personnel at 719-A. Critical patients will be treated by EMS personnel and transported to an offsite hospital (simulated). Injured personnel (adversaries) not employed on site will be transported offsite.

Simulated injured individual(s) will not be transported offsite.

Security Measures

I.1 Determine and implement appropriate access and egress control measures for the site, affected areas, incident scene and emergency response facilities in accordance with approved procedures.

Extent of Play:

Access and egress control measures will be demonstrated in accordance with EPIP 6Q-103, "Protective Actions"; EPIP 6Q-300, "Command Room Operations"; SRSOC 317-1, "Operations Center Response to Emergencies"; ESOP 2-201, "Emergency Security Operations Procedure"; WSI-SRS Standard Procedures 2-104 "Access Control"; and, 2-122, "Law Enforcement." Security personnel shall not deviate from assigned duties, which could cause an area or facility to become vulnerable. An effective cordon will be established and maintained around the incident scene.

WSI Law Enforcement personnel will simulate the closing of all SRS perimeter barricades (as a result of an emergency declaration). Scenario data injects will provide simulated conditions to indicate vehicle traffic for the time-frame that traffic is stopped at each barricade, until the ERO makes and implements a decision to reopen barricades. Security personnel will be deployed to roadblock locations; however, roadblocks will not be physically erected, and normal traffic movement outside an area or facility will not be impeded, other than at SRS

**SAVANNAH RIVER SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL
EXERCISE
February 25, 1998**

Road 8 and at the Classification Yard. Other security measures required outside the incident area will be simulated.

Coordination and communications with local law enforcement officials will be simulated through the use of a control cell. Access to the EOC and SRSOC will be in accordance with EOC procedures and WSI Post Orders. JIC access control will be in accordance with JIC procedures and WSI Post orders.

Additional on-scene objectives and Extent of Play, to be used to brief controllers are contained in the WSI Test Plan and are kept under separate cover for security purposes. The test plan is available by request on a need-to-know basis.

I.2 Determine the credibility of the threat in accordance with approved procedures.

Extent of Play:

The Public Relations Officer may use the SRS bomb threat call checklist to accurately record information received from the local TV station from the adversary caller, and may pass this information to the SRSOC/EDO.

The Transportation Dispatcher and the Emergency Duty Officer (EDO) should use the SRS Form For Recording Threats (bomb threat call checklist) to accurately record information received from the adversary caller.

The EDO and WSI-SRS Lieutenant will make a determination of the bomb threat credibility in accordance with ESOP 2-201, "Emergency Security Operations Procedure"; SRSOC 309-5, "Security Events"; Attachment 9 of EPIP 6Q-116, "Credible vs. Non-Credible Threat Situation Indicators"; and SRSOC 317-1, "Operations Center Response to Emergencies."

I.3 Determine and implement the appropriate responses to an explosion or to confirmed explosive devices in accordance with approved procedures.

Extent of Play:

Prior to the shelter protective action, the EDO may consult with WSI-SRS. The EDO may also reference EPIP 6Q-116, Attachment 13, "Confirmed Explosive Devices: Protective Actions For Onsite Employees" and Attachment 14, "Post Explosion Activities." After protective actions have been implemented, the EOC should coordinate activities with the WSI-SRS Lieutenant for dispatch of canine units to search the classification yard, train engine and cars, and adversary van, if apprehended.

**SAVANNAH RIVER SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL
EXERCISE
February 25, 1998**

If a simulated explosive device is detonated or found, the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) unit at Fort Jackson will be notified and requested to respond.

I.4 Demonstrate the ability to implement crime scene preservation in accordance with approved procedures.

Extent of Play:

The Security organization will determine the physical extent of and isolate the crime scene using all appropriate equipment, such as barrier tape, cones, etc. Various props will be staged to signify the effects of bomb detonation damage to the shipping container at the detached train car. All evidence should be marked and identified in accordance with WSI-SRS Standard Procedures 3-5905, "Criminal Investigation Procedure"; 3-5912, "Criminal Investigation Evidence Procedure"; and, 3-5915, "Evidence Procedure". Personnel at the simulated explosion scene should practice ALARA and take precautions against contamination and potential exposure.

I.5 Demonstrate the ability of the WSI Crisis Negotiations Team (CNT) to conduct negotiations with the adversaries in accordance with approved procedures.

Extent of Play:

This objective will be demonstrated by the WSI Crisis Negotiations Team per the objectives and Extent of Play outlined in the WSI Test Plan, kept under separate cover for security purposes. The test plan is available by request on a need-to-know basis.

I.6 Demonstrate the ability of the WSI Special Response Team (SRT) to apprehend/capture the fleeing adversaries in accordance with approved procedures.

Extent of Play:

This objective will be demonstrated by the WSI Special Response Team (SRT) per the objectives and Extent of Play outlined in the WSI Test Plan, kept under separate cover for security purposes. The test plan is available by request on a need-to-know basis.

**SAVANNAH RIVER SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL
EXERCISE
February 25, 1998**

Emergency Facilities and Equipment

J. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, and status displays to support emergency operations.

Extent of Play:

This objective will be demonstrated at each participating facility (SRSOC, EOC, and JIC). SRSOC, EOC, and JIC personnel will maintain status boards and displays and use appropriate communications, monitoring and computer modeling equipment, and systems in accordance with their respective procedures.

For TOC and CNT Operations Objectives, refer to WSI Test Plan kept under separate cover for security purposes. The test plan is available by request on a need-to-know basis.

Recovery and Reentry

K. Develop a Recovery Plan Outline that includes reentry, as applicable, in accordance with approved procedures.

Extent of Play:

This objective will be partially demonstrated by the Recovery Team in accordance with EPIP 6Q-113, "Termination and Recovery Planning." Given the artificial time constraints of the exercise, recovery planning and implementation of recovery strategies will be impractical. Reentry, however, should be performed in attempts to quantify and status the extent and magnitude of the damage to the train cars or radiological materials shipment. A Recovery Team will also be established, which should have time to complete development of a Recovery Plan Outline. Approval of a Recovery Plan Outline by the DOE-SR Emergency Manager is the most that may be accomplished, but is not required to satisfy this objective. As a minimum, discussion of the Recovery Plan Checklist in EPIP 6Q-113 by the Recovery Team is required.

Conduct of Exercise

L.1. Demonstrate the ability of the SRS Emergency Services Department (ESD) and the WSI Emergency Management Section (WSI-EMS) to develop a scenario which emphasizes site-specific emergency events and response activities and minimizes the use of generic, non-specific simulations.

**SAVANNAH RIVER SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL
EXERCISE
February 25, 1998**

Extent of Play:

This objective will be demonstrated by ESD and WSI-EMS through the development of a scenario which is plausible, provides a challenging sequence of events, and minimizes simulations.

L.2. Demonstrate the ability of the controller/evaluator organization to effectively control the exercise to fulfill the exercise objectives.

Extent of Play:

This objective will be demonstrated by the controller/evaluator organization. Controllers will receive formal controller/evaluator training and will attend one or more controller/evaluator briefings prior to the exercise. Controllers will demonstrate the utmost regard for exercise participant safety. Formal controller/evaluator protocol and communications will be demonstrated. The adequacy of objective demonstration will be determined by comments received during the player/controller/evaluator debrief.

For additional WSI Objectives, refer to the WSI Test Plan kept under separate cover for security purposes. The test plan is available by request on a need-to-know basis.

L.3. Demonstrate the ability of the controller/evaluator organization to evaluate the emergency preparedness program and determine findings in accordance with established criteria.

Extent of Play:

This objective will be demonstrated by the controller/evaluator organization through observations and feedback provided by and to players during the player/controller/evaluator debriefs and the formal critiques.

Controller/evaluators will be provided facility/team/function specific objectives and criteria upon which to base their evaluations. Findings and recommendations will be outlined in the exercise report issued after the exercise.

L.4. Demonstrate the ability of the controller/evaluator organization to conduct meaningful critiques which discuss both positive and negative aspects of the exercise and to document issues for corrective action.

**SAVANNAH RIVER SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL
EXERCISE
February 25, 1998**

Extent of Play:

This objective will be demonstrated by the controller/evaluator organization through accurate observations and feedback provided during the player/controller/evaluator debriefs and the formal critiques. Issues will be documented in the exercise report.

SRS EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL EXERCISE
FEBRUARY 25, 1998

Rev. 03.0-_ F9250028-EX

SAVANNAH RIVER SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL EXERCISE

February 25, 1998

3.0-1 DOE HQ Objectives

The Objectives listed in this section are based on a simulated transportation emergency and will be performed and evaluated according to the standard outlined in the Extent of Play.

Emergency Response Organization

A. The DOE HQ Emergency Management Team (EMT) will perform their missions, specified authorities and responsibilities for emergency response and mitigation in accordance with approved procedures.

Extent of Play:

This objective will be demonstrated by each entity of the DOE Headquarters Technical Operations Cadre (TOC) as it would in an emergency. The following DOE HQ organizations will participate in the exercise: Office of Non-Proliferation and National Security - Office of Emergency Management (NN-60); Office of Security Affairs (NN-50); Office of Energy Intelligence (NN-30); Office of Environmental Management (EM); Office of Defense Programs (DP), Office of Environment, Safety and Health (EH); Office of Public Affairs (PA); and the Office of Congressional Affairs (CI). Internal information flow within the HQ Emergency Operations Center (EOC) will also be demonstrated by the use and accuracy of the electronic status boards, emergency status update reports, management briefings, and the operational readiness of the equipment. Emergency response also includes the simulated activation, notification, and deployment of the national radiological assets as requested by the site and approved through the DOE radiological response asset advisor on the DOE Headquarters EMT.

Offsite Response Interfaces

B. Effectively interface and coordinate with Federal agencies, Congress, the White House, and other organizations responsible for offsite emergency response, protection of the environment, and health and safety of the public.

**SAVANNAH RIVER SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL
EXERCISE
February 25, 1998**

Extent of Play:

A simulated cell will be used to play other Federal organizations. The DOE HQ EMT will interact with other Federal organizations per EPIP - Coordination Team, to keep them updated on the status of the event and provide coordination as needed. Congressional and Intergovernmental activities and information will be coordinated with the DOE HQ EMT Congressional, Intergovernmental Advisor. The DOE HQ EMT will respond to requests for information from Congress, the White House, other federal agencies, and state organizations.

Determination of Emergency Class

C. Accurately classify, upgrade, downgrade and/or terminate the emergency classification in a timely manner.

Extent of Play:

The DOE HQ EMT will provide oversight in the classification of the emergency, knowledge of *Savannah River's Emergency Management Plan* and its associated emergency action levels as referenced in the DOE Order 151.1 and *DOE Headquarters Emergency Management Plan*.

Notifications and Communications

D. Accurately perform all onsite (HQ ERO and HQ senior management) and offsite (other National Federal agencies) notifications in accordance with DOE Order 151.1 and the *DOE Headquarters Emergency Management Plan*.

Extent of Play:

Notifications will be received from the Savannah River Operations Office of the emergency event to the DOE HQ Watch Office. The DOE HQ Watch Office will ascertain emergency notification as per the DOE HQ Watch Office procedures. Further notification of the Director of Emergency Management (NN-60), the affected Program Office (EM) will be made. The notification to the Emergency Manager (NN-1) will be simulated. The Watch Office will notify the EM Emergency Management Coordinator of the emergency. EM-60 will confer with EM-1 (simulated) regarding activation of the EMT. The three-way telecon between NN-1, NN-60, and EM on the decision to activate a Headquarters EMT will be simulated. Once a decision is made to activate an EMT, the watch office and/or the Federal Agency Communicator on the HQ EMT will make further notification and status update reports to DOE senior management and external national federal agencies.

**SAVANNAH RIVER SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL
EXERCISE
February 25, 1998**

These notifications will be made to a simulated cell. The DOE HQ Watch Office will continue to monitor the event and receive periodic status information until a turnover brief is conducted to the Emergency manager and/or DCS. The DOE HQ EMT will establish and maintain an open line with the SRS EOC. Information/data will be communicated and coordinated through the open line, the SUN system, and video teleconferences between the TOC and the SRS EOC.

Consequence Assessment

E. Provide oversight to the site's consequence assessment activities.

Extent of Play:

The DOE HQ EMT ES&H advisor will be in contact with the site's ES&H representative throughout the emergency event.

Protective Actions

F. Provide oversight to the site's protective actions onsite and recommended protective actions offsite.

Extent of Play:

The DOE HQ EMT ES&H advisor will be in contact with the site's ES&H representative throughout the emergency event. The EMT ES&H advisor will provide technical expertise as needed by the DCS. The DOE HQ EMT will review onsite protective actions and recommended offsite protective action recommendations.

Public Information

G.1. Develop and disseminate accurate and timely information to the national news media and coordinate with SRS in accordance with DOE policy.

Extent of Play:

The DOE HQ EMT Public Affairs Advisor will be in continual contact with the DOE Public Affairs Office in the coordination of the site's public affairs releases and media briefings, and in the development of DOE Headquarters press releases. Once a briefing/release has been developed by the DOE HQ EMT, the manager of the HQ EMT will approve prior to dissemination.

**SAVANNAH RIVER SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL
EXERCISE**

February 25, 1998

G.2. Coordinate with the site on their press releases.

Extent of Play:

The DOE HQ Public Information Advisor will coordinate the site's press releases with the Deputy Chief of Staff and the DOE Headquarters Public Affairs Office.

Emergency Response Staff Activities

H.1. Staff and activate emergency facilities and teams in an effective and timely manner and in accordance with approved procedures.

Extent of Play:

Participating DOE HQ organizations will be prepositioned in the Forrestal Building for the exercise. Personnel will report to the DOE HQ EOC following notification of the DOE HQ Watch Office from SRS. NN-60 will initially staff and ready the HQ EOC. Admission into the HQ EOC after the notification will be timed to speed up activation.

H.2. Technical, logistic and administrative support functions are performed under emergency conditions.

Extent of Play:

Information is accurately transmitted in an orderly and documented manner between DOE HQ EOC and SRS EOC and other emergency facilities as needed (SRS JIC). An open line is established between DOE HQ EOC and SRS EOC to transmit information. The DOE HQ Watch Office will conduct a turnover briefing to the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) and/or to the Emergency Manager (EM). Upon assuming control of the TOC, the Deputy Chief of Staff will conduct a briefing to the TOC Staff. The TOC Team Leaders will regularly provide status briefings and information (technical and support) as appropriate, to the DCS. Likewise, the DCS will brief the DOE HQ EMT on a regular basis.

Security Measures

I. Review for potential threat assessment activities related to the incident.

Extent of Play:

The DOE Headquarters Security Advisor and Threat Assessment Advisor will be in continual contact with their counterpart at the site. All significant information will be provided to the Deputy Chief of Staff for approval and release prior to dissemination outside the Headquarters EMT. The DOE HQ EMT Security Advisor will provide information as needed to the Technical Team Leader/DCS.

**SAVANNAH RIVER SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL
EXERCISE
February 25, 1998**

Emergency Facilities and Equipment

J. The DOE Headquarters EMT will demonstrate the readiness and reliability of EOC equipment in providing information exchange throughout the DOE EMT and with SRS EOC.

Extent of Play:

The Technical Operations Cadre of the Headquarters EMT will utilize the emergency communication network (ECN) (e.g., videoteleconferencing, computer system [e-mail, document exchange] and the electronic status boards) during the exercise.

Recovery and Reentry

K. The DOE HQ EMT will provide oversight in the development and approval of the site's recovery plan.

Extent of Play:

The DOE HQ EMT will provide the technical knowledge and oversight to the site in their development of the recovery plan. This will be done by continual communication with counterparts at the affected site and their management.

Exercise Control

L.1. The DOE HQ EMT Control organization will demonstrate knowledge of exercise control

Extent of Play:

The control organization provides training to exercise responders and the control organization prior to exercise conduct. Controllers have identification that ensures exercise responders can be easily identified.

L.2. The DOE HQ controller organization will conduct a meaningful critique with the responders which discusses both the positive and negative aspects of the exercise, and document issues for corrective action.

**SAVANNAH RIVER SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL
EXERCISE
February 25, 1998**

Extent of Play:

The DOE HQ controller organization will conduct a critique with the responders at the conclusion of the exercise. The controller organization will give a brief synopsis of the scenario and allow the responders to self-critique their response. The critique should discuss both positive and negative aspects of the response.

SRS EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL EXERCISE
FEBRUARY 25, 1998

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