



***U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Independent Oversight
and Performance Assurance***

Inspection Trends and Perspectives

Presentation to the Security Education

Special Interest Group

April 2003



Discussion Outline

- Inspection Scope and Approach
- Overall Perspectives/Concerns
- Personnel Security Topic Specifics




Mission

**Provide Independent Feedback on the Protection
Provided Special Nuclear Material, Classified
Matter, and Sensitive Unclassified Information**



Organizational Structure





Inspection Scope

- **Topical Areas Covered:**
 - Program Management
 - Physical Security Systems
 - Material Control and Accountability
 - Protective Force
 - Personnel Security
 - Classified Matter Protection and Control
 - Unclassified Cyber Security Program
 - Classified Cyber Security Program



Inspection Scope

- Revised Independent Oversight Order: DOE O 470.2B “Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance Program”, Approved 10-31-02
- Topic Reviews include SCIFs and SAPs
- New Inspection Process
- Joint Inspections with Cyber Security Office
- Increased Emphasis on Performance Testing



Key Perspectives/Concerns

- Post 9-11 expanded security measures and supplemental funding have contributed to an overall increase in protection
- Knowledgeable Security Staffs
- Integrated Safeguards and Security Management (ISSM)



Key Perspectives/Concerns

- **Clarification of Roles and Responsibilities and Increased Accountability**
- **Network perimeters are improving, in most cases.**
- **Classified cyber security is generally good.**
- **Some sites are conducting more vulnerability scanning and penetration testing to self-identify weaknesses.**



Key Perspectives/Concerns (cont.)

- Excessive Levels of Protective Force (PF) Overtime
 - Recruitment of PF Personnel
- Reduced site emphasis upon PF training and performance testing
 - Expected Changes in DBT
- Inability to conduct meaningful protection program planning



Key Perspectives/Concerns (cont.)

- The Department continues to struggle with timely formulation, concurrence, and implementation of requirements
- Insufficient emphasis upon Safeguards and Security research and development
- Uncertainty regarding levels of Safeguards and Security funding



Key Perspectives/Concerns (cont.)

- **Security Systems Crossroads**
 - New Projects and Security Considerations
- **Internal Network Security**
- **Root Cause Analysis Identification and Corrective Actions**



Personnel Security Inspections

- **Critical Program Elements**
 - Personnel Clearance
 - Human Reliability
 - Foreign Visits and Assignments
 - Safeguards and Security Awareness (SSAP)

Personnel Security Inspections

Emphasis Areas

- **Employees with Access to SNM and Sensitive Classified Information**
- **Awareness of Safeguards and Security Responsibility**
- **FV&A Program, including INS Data and Risk Analysis**
- **Access Controls**

Personnel Security Perspectives/Concerns

Effective Clearance Program

Good Support of Human Reliability Programs

**Security Awareness Programs Meet DOE
Requirements**

Personnel Security Perspectives/Concerns

**Documenting Resolution of Derogatory Information
Temporary Suspensions from Duties Requiring
Human Reliability Program Enrollment**

**Drug Testing and Reporting Use of Prescription
Medication**

Personnel Security Perspectives/Concerns

**Tracking High Volumes of Foreign National Visits
Use of FACTS**

**Assessing Risk of Foreign Visits and Assignments
including Cyber Risks**

Access Procedures for Non-HRP Employees

Closing Remarks

Work Together to Protect DOE Interests

Augmentee Program

Continue Dialogue