Performance-Based Contracts

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Ames Laboratory Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Brookhaven National Labortory Los Alamos National Laboratory
DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Jefferson Lab Stanford Linear Accelerator Center
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory Other Related Information

Ames Laboratory This Appendix B sets forth the process to be used in the evaluation of Ames Laboratory (Ames) performance as required by Article 6 of the contract. The process described in this Appendix utilizes, to the extent possible, a set of "objectives," "measures," and "expectations" against which Ames Laboratory's performance will be assessed for each area identified herein.

Brookhaven National Laboratory    This Contract Appendix contains Brookhaven National Laboratory's FY1999 Critical Outcomes, Objectives and Performance Measures. It sets forth the performance evaluation system (including processes, criteria, schedules, and measures) that will be used to evaluate the overall performance of Brookhaven Science Associates (BSA) in the management and operation of Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) in FY99, as required by Articles 6, 7, and 12A of the Contract.

  • BNL-DOE Partnering Agreement  This agreement, between the U.S. Department of Energy's Brookhaven Group (BHG) and Brookhaven Science Associates for Brookhaven National Laboratory, was signed in May 1998. Accompanying the agreement when it was distributed to BNLers on June 24 was a memo signed by BNL Director John Marburger.

DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations  These seventeen attachments (in PDF format) contain DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations' Technical Support and Management Performance Criteria, Performance Measures, and FY99 Outputs (Minimum and Target) for each specific area. [NOTE: Disregard page numbering on the files with an asterisk (*) placed next to them.]

Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility (214kb PDF)   This appendix sets forth the basis upon which an evaluation of the performance of the Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility (otherwise known as "Jefferson Lab;" formerly CEBAF) will be conducted. The evaluation procedure utilizes a set of "key indicators" which will broadly measure the laboratory's performance in seven critical areas. Associated with most "key indicators" (both peer reviews and performance metrics) is a set of "secondary indicators" which will measure the laboratory's performance in a more detailed way and extend the validity of each respective "key indicator."

University of California/DOE Contracts  These pages are the official UC/DOE Contracts maintained by the University of California's Office of the President, Laboratory Administration Office. The University administers three DOE laboratories: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory. Each of these laboratories' Appendix F, "Objective Standards of Performance," is linked below. These appendices contain the performance objectives, criteria, and measures (POCMs) which are the components of the performance-based management system that the University and DOE will utilize for Laboratory oversight as described in Clause 2.6, Performance-Based Management. The POCMs will be clear and reasonable objective standards against which the University's overall compliance with obligations under this contract will be assessed.

FAQs: Appendix F and Performance-Based Management   Frequently asked questions about the performance-based management process under LLNL's contract.

Guide to Key Lab Policies Related to Prime Contract Requirements 

Appendix F Performance-Based Management Process   This page provides links to Web sites related to the UC/DOE/tri-Lab Appendix F performance-based management (PBM) process specific to LLNL and links to numerous other DOE and non-DOE Web sites related to PBM and/or quality management.

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 

  • Fiscal Year 1999 represents the third full year utilizing a results-oriented, performance-based evaluation for the Contractor’s operations and management of the DOE Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (here after referred to as the Laboratory). However, this is the first year that the Contractor’s fee is totally performance-based utilizing the same Critical Outcomes. This document describes the critical outcomes, objectives, performance indicators, expected levels of performance, and the basis for the evaluation of the Contractor’s performance for the period October 1, 1998 through September 30, 1999, as required by Clauses entitled “Use of Objective Standards of Performance, Self Assessment and Performance Evaluation” and “Performance Measures Review” of the Contract DE-AC06-76RL01830. Furthermore, it documents the distribution of the total available performance-based fee and the methodology set for determining the amount of fee earned by the Contractor as stipulated within the clauses entitled “Estimated Cost and Annual Fee,” “Total Available Fee” and “Allowable Costs and Fee.” In partnership with the Contractor and other key customers, the Department of Energy (DOE) Headquarters (HQ) and Richland Operations Office (RL) has defined four critical outcomes that serve as the core for the Contractor’s performance-based evaluation and fee determination. The Contractor also utilizes these outcomes as a basis for overall management of the Laboratory.

Stanford Linear Accelerator Center

  • FY 99 Performance Measures (3.87mb PDF) This Appendix B sets forth the performance measures and criteria on which an evaluation of the Laboratory's performance will be principally measured, and the process for their alteration. The performance measures contained in this Appendix B, along with the results of a self-assessment program, will form a set of indicators that will track, measure, and assess the Laboratory's performance in several critical areas.

Other Related Information (Also see Performance-Based Contracts in our Links section.)

  • Contract Administration - Best Practices Guide  This U.S. Army site addresses: (1) clarifying the Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative’s (COTR's) roles and responsibilities; (2) improving methods of processing contract vouchers and invoices; and (3) improving procedures for closing contracts.
  • Contracting For Best Value: A Best Practices Guide to Source Selection This U.S. Army Material Command (AMC) Pamphlet 715-3 guide provides techniques and practices for obtaining best value products and services through source selection. Consistent with the spirit of acquisition reform, it introduces new and innovative techniques to simplify the source selection process and produce better value. Its purpose is to provide you with a practical reference tool that will help you implement a new way of doing business that promotes flexibility, streamlining, and simplified procedures. This guide is designed for use by the entire acquisition workforce to promote a consistent understanding of best value and the various processes and techniques that can be used to achieve it. It explains best practices for planning your source selection, teaming, exchanging information with industry, and conducting efficient and effective source selections.
  • Department of Energy: Lessons Learned Incorporated Into Performance-Based Incentive Contracts [GAO RCED-98-223, July 29, 1998 (12 pages)]. As part of its efforts to reform its management of contract operations, the Energy Department (DOE) in 1994 began using performance-based incentives in contracts for managing and operating its facilities. These incentives are intended to better link contractors' fees to the satisfactory accomplishment of specific tasks. However, DOE's Office of Inspector General has identified problems with the Department's implementation of performance-based contracting at several facilities. In addition, DOE's October 1997 departmentwide assessment of performance-based incentives in contracting identified other problems and recommended corrective actions. The assessment also cited examples of the successful use of performance-based incentives. This report reviews performance-based incentives at DOE's Hanford, Idaho Falls, Rocky Flats, and Savannah River sites to determine (1) the extent to which DOE has incorporated lessons learned in developing its fiscal year 1998 performance-based incentives, (2) whether these incentives incorporate the baseline measures in DOE's 10-year plan for environmental cleanup and how the fees are allocated to the incentives; and (3) how DOE evaluates completed incentive measures and determines their effectiveness.
  • Contract Reform Self Assessment Report September, 1997 (350k PDF file) The primary objective of this self assessment is to report on on the Department of Energy's progress in implementing the Contract Reform Initiative launched in February 1994 and to discuss remaining challenges.
  • Contract Reform Features in Solicitations/Contracts The Contract Reform Initiative has spawned a number of new and innovative features in recent contract actions, including competitive solicitations. The following is a compilation of such features. Some of these may be site-specific; others may provide a model for future actions. It is our intention to update the list from time to time.
  • Status of Contract Reform Initiative Contract Reform is fundamentally changing the way the Department does business. The culture of the Department is increasingly characterized by receptivity and responsiveness to new ideas, new partners, and new contracting approaches and structures. Numerous initiatives are underway to replace outmoded and burdensome practices.
  • National Laboratories: DOE Needs to Assess the Impact of Using Performance-Based Contracts (United States General Accounting Office Report to the Committee on Science, House of Representatives; GAO/RCED-99-141; May, 1999) From the report: "DOE's use of performance-based contracting for its laboratories is in a state of transition. While all laboratory contracts we examined had some performance-based features, we found wide variance in the number of performance measures and the types of fees negotiated."
 

 

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