

# Is it Just A Bunch of Guys? - Evaluating the Sageman Theory of Terrorism.

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# Overview

- Background
- Theory & Hypothesis
- Data
- Analysis
- Results
- Conclusion
- Future Directions

# Background: Competing Explanations

- Since the mid 1960s many theoretical explanations for terrorism have been advanced:
  - Religion
  - Poverty
  - Demographic composition
  - Insanity

# Background (cont.): Sageman vs. Hoffman

- More recently research has focused on understanding group formation & violence among Arab terrorists.
- Recent debate
  - *Sageman vs. Hoffman*: whether terrorist groups are more hierarchically organized or comprised of flatly distributed social networks.
- Debate requires theory testing to move forward.

# Background: The “Bunch of Guys” Theory In Brief

- Formulated by Marc Sageman (Sageman, 2005, 2006, 2007).
- **A group based social psychological processes theory of terrorism.** Contains four core steps arranged in a temporal order.

# Background: The “Bunch of Guys” Theory In Brief

(1) Alienation



(2) Homophilic Association



(3) Closed Society



(4) Jihad Membership & Violence

# Research Questions

- **Q1:** Are indicators of the “Bunch of Guys” theory related to terrorist acts?
- **Q2:** Do indicators of the “Bunch of Guys” theory provide more explanatory power than alternative explanations?

# Data: The Sageman Terrorism Database

- A *convenience sample* developed to define the *individual characteristics* and *relationship structure* of members of the global salafi jihad.
- Inclusion criteria:
  - Members of “islamist” organizations
  - Stated goal of targeting foreign governments and pursuance of salafi objectives, n = 366 males.

# Data (cont.)

- For example...



Usama Bin Laden



Adam Yahiyeh Gadahn



Abdelkarim Hussein Mohamed Al-Nasser



Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah



Ayman Al-Zawahiri



Ali Atwa



Anas Al-Liby



Fazul Abdullah Mohammed



Hasan Izz-Al-Din

# Data Collection

- Assembled by Sageman Consulting, LLC, the data was abstracted from a combination of sources:
  - Reviews of legal transcripts & gov docs
  - News reports
  - Personal interviews with key experts
  - Other sources.

# Analysis

- Descriptive one and two way tables.
- Descriptive logistic regressions.
- All calculations done in SAS version 9.0.

# Analysis Operationalization

- **Outcome:**

- *Any participation in terrorist operations, 1 or 0.*

- **Predictors:**

**Alternative Explanations:**

- **Demographics, religiosity and economic disadvantage:**

marital status, age, religiosity, madrassa attendance and unskilled labor, low socioeconomic status and less than high school education (all 1, 0).


**SageMan's “Bunch of Guys”:**

- *Alienation*: Living as an expatriate (1 vs. 0)

- *Homophilic association*: Pre-jihad clique membership (1 if in a four or more person clique)

- *Closed society*: Any family in Jihad (1 vs. 0).

**Table 1: Percent Participating in Terrorist Operations\***



\*Data Source: Sageman Terrorism Database. Figures calculated using SAS v9.0.

**Table 2: “Bunch of Guys” by Pct. Engaged in One or More Terrorist Operations**

<b>“Bunch of Guys” Measures</b>	<b>Percent Engaging In One or More Operations*</b>		
	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Sig?</b>
Expatriate	<b>53.9</b>	<b>80.3</b>	<b>.001</b>
Pre-jihad Clique Membership	54.4	49.3	NS
Any Family in Jihad	12.7	21.1	NS

\*Data Source: Sageman Terrorism Database. Figures shown are column percentages. Figures calculated using SAS v9.0 Chi-square test of independence. NS = Not significantly different.

## Table 3: Comparative Multivariate Models Showing Impact Of Covariates on Terrorist Operations

	Any Terrorist Operation (Odds Ratio)*	
Covariates	Alternative Explanations	Alternatives and “Bunch of Guys”
<b>Bunch of Guys</b>		
Expatriate		<b>0.303*</b>
Pre-jihad clique membership		1.241
Any Family in Jihad		1.217
<b>Demographics</b>		
Married	1.189	1.336
Age	0.986	0.999
<b>Religiosity</b>		
Attended Madrassa	<b>0.056**</b>	<b>0.063**</b>
Religious Background	<b>5.693*</b>	<b>5.800*</b>
<b>Economic Disadvantage</b>		
Unskilled Labor	<b>0.323*</b>	<b>0.369*</b>
Low SES	1.985	1.689
Less than HS Ed	2.103	1.792
<b>Pseudo R Square</b>	.100	.130
<b>2 Log Likelihood</b>	194.765	187.968
<b>Model n =</b>	214	214

\*Data Source: Sageman Terrorism Database. \*p.<.05 \*\* p<.01. Figures calculated using SAS v9.0.

# Results

**Q1:** Are “Bunch of Guys” indicators related to terrorist acts?

**A1:** No.

- Only one of the three indicators is statistically significant, *but in an unexpected direction* (expatriate, OR = .330,  $p < .05$ ).

## Results (cont.)

**Q2:** Do indicators of “Bunch of Guys” theory provide more explanatory power than alternatives?

**A2:** No.

- “Bunch of Guys” variables *fail to substantially improve the fit of the model*, (pseudo r-squared .100 vs., .130).
- Results are similar when specified using linear, ordinal logistic and multinomial modeling methods.

# Conclusions

1. “Bunch of Guys” **DOES NOT APPEAR** substantially related to terrorist operations.
2. Results contradict previous research, but **further study is needed.**
  - Similar ideas are strongly supported, examples
    - Sutherland’s differential association
    - Bandera's social learning.

# Limitations

- **Small Ns.** Models have only 214 cases, possibly not enough power to pick up weak relationships.
- **Lack of Psychological Measures:** Human relationships are dynamic. However, most variables in the STDB are static & don't measure psychology.
- **Fuzzy Boundaries:** Data may not fully capture the extent of the Al-Qaeda and affiliated networks, boundaries of the jihadi network are unclear.

# Policy & Future Directions

- Policy recommendations?
  - *None at this time, lack of support too preliminary.*
- Authors currently working on replicating these findings using an updated version of the data.

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