

Examining Terrorist Organization's Social Networks


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Big Allied And Deadly (BAAD) Dataset

- Original dataset built of MIPT relational data
- Covered the period 1998-2005, one block
- Collected network data and attribute data
 - Ally, Faction, Suspected Ally, Founder, Rival, etc
 - Group size, Ideology, Home base, etc
- Final BAAD 1 dataset contained information on 395 terrorist organizations

BAAD 1 Social Networks




Two Key Findings from BAAD 1

- Terrorist Organizations appear to be broken into syndicates, largely based on some combination of geography and ideology
- The more alliances (using a simple degree measure) a terrorist organization has the more lethal it is (Asal & Rethemeyer 2008)


BAAD 2: Preliminary Data

- Major improvements over BAAD 1:
 - Time series data over 10 years, 1998-2007
 - Gathered from a wider selection of open sources
 - Data on ideological, material, or membership nature of the relationships
- Currently are cleaning data
- Many more organizations involved
- Density of connections, especially across syndicates has greatly increased


BAAD 2 “Main Network”



BAAD 2 “Christian Identity Network”



BAAD 2 "ISI 1 Step Egocentric Network"



Current Research

- 3 Types/Motivations for Terrorist Alliances:
 - Ideological Solidarity
 - Enemy of my Enemy
 - Business Alliances
- When/Why these types of alliances form?
- What are implications for the overall structure and fighting these types of terrorist alliances?

Questions?